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Vicarious Liability. Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453 (R.I.
2002). Automobile leasing companies are liable for injuries caused
by the drivers of their automobiles pursuant to two vicarious liabil-
ity statutes. Long-term lessors are liable as vehicle owners for the
purposes of section 31-33-6 of the Rhode Island General Laws. Ad-
ditionally, they are liable as lessors for the purposes of section 31-
34-4 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island Supreme Court consolidated two personal
injury cases in which plaintiffs were seeking redress from long-
term automobile lessors.'
The first case involved a car leased by Salvatore Lombardi
from Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance (Chase).2 The plain-
tiff, Judith Oliveira, was seriously injured in a rear-end collision
with the car in 1998.3 At the time of the accident, Mr. Lombardi's
son was driving the vehicle. 4 Two years later Ms. Oliveira sued
Chase. 5 Charging that the accident was the result of the younger
Lombardi's negligence, Ms. Oliveira claimed that Chase was vicar-
iously liable pursuant to two Rhode Island statutes.6 Subse-
quently, Chase sought, and was granted, summary judgment on
the issue of its liability.7 The plaintiff timely appealed.8
The second case involved a car leased by Gold Key Lease, Inc.
(Gold Key) to Joseph FalcoY As the lease allowed, Mr. Falco lent
the car to Joseph Tiberi. 10 Mr. Tiberi then collided with a motorcy-
cle driven by the plaintiff, Michael Ayers.' 1 At the time of the acci-
dent, Mr. Falco's insurance on the vehicle had lapsed. 12 The
plaintiff claimed that Gold Key was vicariously liable pursuant to
1. Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 455 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-33-6, 31-34-4 (1998)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 456.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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both sections 31-33-6 and 31-34-4.13 Summary judgment was
granted to Gold Key, and the plaintiff timely appealed. 1
4
ANALYSIS AND HOLDINGS
Owner Liability
The court first interpreted section 31-33-6 as it applied to both
cases:' 5
Whenever any motor vehicle shall be used, operated, or
caused to be operated upon any public highway of this state
with the consent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, thereof,
expressed or implied, the driver thereof, if other than the
owner, or lessee, or bailee, shall in the case of an accident be
deemed to be the agent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, of
the motor vehicle unless the driver shall have furnished proof
of financial responsibility in the amount set forth in chapter
32 of this title, prior to the accident; and for the purposes of
this section the term 'owner' shall include any person, firm,
copartnership, association, or corporation having the lawful
possession or control of a motor vehicle under a written sale
agreement. 16
The court based its decision on the first part of the definition of
owner as described in section 31-1-17(b), the definition section of
the Motor Vehicle Code, 17 and held that Chase and Gold Key were
owners because they held title to the vehicles.' 8 The court dis-
missed the alternative definition of owner found in section 31-1-
17(b),' 9 determining it did not apply to section 31-33-6, and con-
strued the definition of owner spelled out in the text of section 31-
33-6, ("and for the purposes of this section the term owner shall
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 457.
16. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-33-6 (1998)) (emphasis omitted).
17. Id. at 453 (explaining an owner is "a person who holds the legal title to a
vehicle" (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-1-17(b) (1978))).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 458 n.4 ("In the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the
conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the
conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession
vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle
is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall
be deemed the owner for the purposes of chapters 1-27, inclusive, of this title."
(citing § 31-1-17(b) (emphasis omitted))).
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include . . .- ),20 to be an expansion of the definition already ac-
knowledged in section 31-1-17(b) so therefore more than one possi-
ble owner was subject to vicarious liability.21 The court held that
consenting owners, such as Chase and Gold Key, could only be pro-
tected from liability under the owner-liability statute if the author-
ized drivers of the leased vehicles provided proof of financial
responsibility before an accident occurred. 22 The court asserted
that its interpretation of the statute was based on the plain mean-
ing of the words in the statute. 23
Lessor Liability
The court then interpreted section 31-34-4 of the Rhode Island
General Laws, as it applied to both cases:
Any owner of a for hire motor vehicle or truck who has given
proof of financial responsibility under this chapter or who in
violation of this chapter has failed to give proof of financial
responsibility, shall be jointly and severally liable with any
person operating the vehicle for any damages caused by the
negligence of any person operating the vehicle by or with the
permission of the owner. Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to prevent an owner who has furnished proof of finan-
cial responsibility or any person operating the vehicle from
making defense in an action upon the ground of contributory
negligence to the extent to which such defense is allowed in
other cases... The term lessor shall include any entity in the
business of renting motor vehicles pursuant to a written
rental agreement. 24
Under section 31-34-4, the court again based its decision on
definitions. 25 The court established that the terms rent and lease
as used throughout the Motor Vehicle Code are interchangeable. 26
Therefore, motor vehicles for hire, which by definition in section
31-1-3(g) are "every motor vehicle... used for transporting persons
for which compensation in any form is received, or motor vehicles
20. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-33-6 (1998)).
21. Id. at 459.
22. Id. at 460.
23. Id. at 461.
24. Id. (quoting 1997 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 353 § 1, as codified in R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 31-31-4 (1998)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Broadway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Asselin, 176 A.2d 714 (R.I. 1961)).
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rented for transporting persons either with or without furnishing
an operator,"27 include leased vehicles such as those owned by
Chase and Gold Key. The court also determined that the definition
of lessor spelled out in section 31-34-4 cited above applied to long
term lessors such as Chase and Gold Key and included rental
agencies as well.28 The court held that the plain meaning of the
statute prescribed liability to long-term lessors. 29
CONCLUSION
Long-term automobile leasing companies are subject to vicari-
ous liability for injuries caused by the drivers of their leased motor
vehicles. Under section 31-33-6, long-term leasing companies are
liable because they are the titled owners of the vehicles. Under
section 31-34-4, long-term leasing companies are liable because
they are lessors who rent motor vehicles without operators.
Johnna Tierney
27. Id. at 462 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-1-3(g) (1998)).
28. Id. at 461-62. The court dismissed the defendant's argument suggesting
that chapter 31-34 in its entirety addresses rental agencies. Id. The title of the
section is Responsibility of Owners of Rental Vehicles, section 31-34-1 and each
subsection speaks to renters of automobiles. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-1
(1998)).
29. Id.
2003]
